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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MICHAEL CHARLES LAYMAN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960814-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of possession
of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii)
(Supp. 1996); driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44
(Supp. 1996); and possession of paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1996).
(A copy of these statutes is attached in addendum A.)
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL
AND STANDARDS QF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly admit the testimony of

Deputy Don Decamp about testing he administered to defendant and
about his opinion concerning the presence of stimulants or
intoxicants in defendant's system?
Issues involving the admissibility of evidence are reviewed
for an abuse of discretion.

Salt Lake City v. Garcia. 912 P.2d

997, 999 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996).
"The trial court has wide discretion in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony, and this court will not
overturn the trial court's determination unless the trial court
exceeded its permissible range of discretion." State ex rel. G.D.
v. L.D.. 894 P.2d 1278, 1284 (Utah App. 1995) (citing State v.
Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993)).
2.

Did the trial court properly consider the contents of

the toxicology report which was admitted pursuant to defendant's
stipulation?
Where defendant challenges the weight given by the trier of
fact to evidence admitted pursuant to the parties' stipulation,
there is no standard of review as the apportionment of both
weight and credibility to testimony and evidence lies exclusively

2

with the trier of fact, as does the determination of what
inferences to draw from the credited facts.

State v. Reed, 839

P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. Baaley. 681
P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984); State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289,
292 (Utah 1982), cert, denied. 460 U.S. 1044 (1983).

A trial

court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and so
long as the findings are not against the clear weight of the
evidence and this court does not otherwise reach a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings will
not be disturbed.

State v. Murphy, 872 P.2d 480, 481-82 (Utah

App. 1994) .
3.

Did the trial court commit reversible error where, in

closing argument, the parties argued over the issue of
constructive possession of contraband, and the trial court's
ruling contains findings consistent with an intent to make a
finding of constructive possession, but the trial court
inappropriately used the term "common enterprise"?
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error,
and so long as the findings are not against the clear weight of
the evidence and this court does not otherwise reach a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings
will not be disturbed.

Murphy, 872 P.2d at 481-82.
3

Moreover, an

appellate court is not necessarily bound by the label attached by
the trial judge to his or her actions.

Cf. State v. Jackson. 857

P.2d 267, 269 (Utah App. 1993) (trial court's label of dismissal
or acquittal is not binding on appellate court); State v. Munsen.
821 P.2d 13, 16 (Utah App. 1991) (trial court's distinction
between findings of facts and conclusions of law are not
necessarily binding on appellate court), cert, denied. 843 P.2d
516 (Utah 1992).
4.

Was there sufficient evidence to support defendant's

convictions of possession of paraphernalia and possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute?
When reviewing a bench trial under a claim of insufficient
evidence, this Court will affirm the lower court's judgment
"unless it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Reed. 839 P.2d at 879
(quoting State v. Goodman. 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988)
(additional quotation omitted)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief.
4

STATEMENT QF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by amended information with driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute, and
possession of paraphernalia (R. 6-7).x

Addendum A.

Following a

preliminary hearing before Judge A. Lynn Payne, defendant was
bound over for trial on all charges (R. 53-54, 230) . Defendant
waived a jury trial and, because Judge Payne had heard the
preliminary hearing, requested a bench trial before Judge John R.
Anderson (R. 38-39) . On December 10, 1996, a bench trial was
held before Judge Anderson in which defendant presented no
testimony (R. 67-68, 80-205).

Immediately thereafter, defendant

waived preparation of a presentence report and was sentenced to
the Utah State Prison for a term of one-to-fifteen years for the
second degree felony, together with concurrent terms of 6 months
for each of the two class B misdemeanors (R. 214, 221-22).

x

The information included a fourth claim, asserting
forfeiture of defendant's interest in the 1970 Chevy Malibu he
was driving at the time he was stopped (R. 6-7). The resolution
of this claim is not apparent from this record.
5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of August 11, 1996, defendant Michael Charles
Layman and his father Hobart Layman arrived in defendant's 1970
Chevy Malibu at the home of Gina Ziegenhirt in Salt Lake City (R.
6, 174). Hobart was going to Vernal to sell some methamphetamine
and asked Gina to go with them, saying she could "double" her
money (R. 175). Gina gave Hobart $500.00, and the three set out
for Vernal with defendant driving (R. 175-76).

Defendant wasn't

speaking to Hobart and was "irritated" because Gina was going to
come along (R. 187). However, while Hobart slept during the
drive, Gina and defendant talked (R. 176-77).

When defendant

discovered that, like him, Gina was having child custody problems
with the State of Utah, he became less tense (R. 189-91) .
The three stopped in a motel in Vernal in the early morning
hours of August 12 where Hobart divided the methamphetamine,
complaining of the inaccuracy of the scales he was using (R. 178,
181). Within twenty to thirty minutes of stopping, they were on
the road again, with defendant driving, to take Hobart to another
place in Vernal (R. 179, 182). Hobart left some of the
methamphetamine with defendant and Gina, handing it to Gina in a
pouch which also held the scales he'd used at the motel (R.

6

182) .2 Gina put the pouch inside the front waistband of her
shorts (R. 99-100).

At the same time, Hobart made arrangements

with them to pick him up again later (R. 182, 187).
Shortly thereafter, defendant and Gina were going southbound
on Vernal Avenue with defendant driving (R. 86, 113, 183). It
was just before 3:00 a.m. when he passed Deputy Shaun Abplanalp
as the deputy was completing a turn into the northbound lanes of
Vernal Avenue at 4000 South Vernal Avenue (R. 86, 113). Upon
making his turn, the deputy looked in his side view mirror and
noticed that the rear end of defendant's car had no working
lights (R. 86, 113). The deputy turned his car around and put on
the emergency overhead lights, intending to effect a traffic stop
due to the unsafe condition of defendant's car (R. 86-87, 113,
115).

When the lights went on, defendant jerked his car suddenly

to the right as if to pull off the road, then again suddenly to
the left so that when the car stopped, it was perpendicular to
the officer's car with the driver's door facing the officer (R.
87, 116). Defendant immediately got out of his car and walked
"briskly" toward the deputy's car (R. 87). Defendant appeared

2

Gina made it clear that she was there for the money only
and not to share in the methamphetamine (R. 182-83, 186-89). She
believed she was just holding it for Hobart (R. 187).
7

upset, and the deputy noticed as defendant got closer that his
eyes were red, bloodshot, and "very, very watery" (R. 89, 118).
The deputy got out to meet defendant, who became immediately
aggressive and began demanding to know why he'd been stopped (R.
87, 90-91).

The deputy explained about the non-working lights,

and the two walked back toward defendant's car (R. 87-88).
Defendant gave the deputy his driver's license and the
registration, then crawled into the trunk to embark on an
unsuccessful attempt to fix the problem (R. 88-89) . After a
brief conversation with defendant, the deputy approached the
passenger, Gina, obtained her name and date of birth, then
returned to his car to check both individuals (R. 92). He then
returned defendant's license and registration (R. 93-94).
The deputy had noticed that defendant appeared to be very
anxious throughout the stop: he could not stay calm, would not
hold still, was constantly in motion, suffered swings in his
moods from calm to very irritated to mad and back, was extremely
fidgety, was demanding, and had eyes that darted back and forth
(R. 89, 91, 94-96, 120, 126). From his training and experience,
he knew that several of these behaviors may indicate the
ingestion of controlled substances (R, 94-96) . These
observations, together with those the officer had noted from the
8

time he turned on his emergency overhead lights, caused the
deputy to ask defendant about the existence of controlled
substances, weapons, and open containers (R. 94, 97) . Defendant
denied possessing any of those items (R. 97)• The officer then
asked if he could check inside the car, to which defendant made a
broad, open gesture toward the car with his arms, palms up, and
told the deputy, "go ahead" (R. 97-98).
The deputy had Gina get out of the car, then, for his own
safety, did a quick pat search of each to check for weapons (R.
98, 125). He found none on defendant, but felt something on Gina
that prompted him to ask her to lift her shirt just above her
waist (R. 98). She complied, and the officer saw a "black
holster pouch" sticking up over the top of the waistband of her
shorts about one inch (R. 98, 100). He asked if it was a weapon,
and she said, "no" as she handed it to him (R. 101). He felt
some hard objects in it, then gave it back and asked what was in
it (R. 101). Gina responded that it didn't contain weapons and
held it behind her right leg (R. 101). The deputy insisted that
he needed to know what was inside the pouch for safety reasons,
but Gina continued to refuse and to act "very nervous" (R. 10102).

At one point, the officer observed her look toward

defendant, who was at the rear of the car on the driver's side
9

four or five feet away (R. 102-03) . Following her gaze, the
officer saw defendant shaking his head back and forth in the
negative (R. 102-03) . The officer then asked to see the contents
and took a step toward Gina (R. 103). She stepped back,
continuing to look toward defendant, and asked if she was under
arrest (R. 103-04).

The officer said no, reiterated that he had

to know the contents of the pouch for safety reasons, then took
the pouch from her hands (R. 104). He discovered that the pouch
contained numerous syringes (two of which had been used), a
spoon, a large baggy of what was later identified as
methamphetamine, and plastic scales (R. 104-08, 110). The
officer immediately arrested Gina (R. 109, 128) .
By this time Deputy Don Decamp and Officer Bo Faircloth had
arrived (R. 83, 110, 122-23, 130-31).

Now feeling able to focus

his efforts without having to worry about safety concerns, and
knowing that Deputy Decamp had both training and experience in
drug recognition evaluation, Deputy Abplanalp asked Decamp to
conduct field sobriety tests on defendant (R. 110, 122-23, 125,
134) .
Decamp had defendant perform seven sobriety tests while at
the scene of the stop (R. 136-45, 163-67),

Based on defendant's

performance of these tests, his physical characteristics, and the
10

officer's other observations, Deputy Decamp determined that
defendant had intoxicants in his system and was incapable of
safely operating a car (R. 146). The physical characteristics
the officer observed which suggested intoxicants or drugs in the
system included "very strong eyelid tremors" readily apparent in
two of the sobriety tests, very red glassy eyes, and, most
importantly, an inability to remain calm and stand still:
defendant kept clutching his hands, making fists, moving, and
"dancing" (R. 146-47) . Decamp later conduct more extensive
testing, commonly called drug recognition evaluation [UDRE"] at
the jail (R. 147). The testing included a breath test--which
registered no alcohol--and several of the tests which had been
conducted at the scene (R. 147-48, 156-57).

Decamp also noticed

several marks from needle injections on the inside of both of
defendant's arms, and explained in detail at the trial how he had
been trained to recognize the difference between needle marks and
areas that are merely red and swollen (R. 157-58).

Like

Abplanalp, Decamp also noticed defendant's red, glassy eyes (R.
157).

However, what most impressed Decamp was defendant's

inability to remain calm in a relatively quiet situation (R. 15859).

Defendant's hands kept moving, he couldn't stand on one

foot very long, he rocked a lot, and he seemed very anxious and
11

fidgety (R. 158-159).

Decamp also looked at defendant's pupils

in four different light settings to help determine what drug was
in his system, and checked his blood pressure (elevated), body
temperature (low), and pulse (accelerated) (R. 159-62).

He

determined that neither Actifed nor any marketed cough syrup,
which defendant claims to have been taking at the time, would
explain any of defendant's physical or behavioral symptoms (R.
162, 168-69).

Instead, he concluded that defendant was under the

influence of a central nervous system stimulant (R. 161).
Deputy Abplanalp thereafter took defendant to the Ashley
Valley Medical Center where he was present while defendant's
blood was drawn (R. Ill, 130). During the blood draw, the
officer noticed that defendant had wa couple of large red lumps
near the vein area in the crotch of his arm" which appeared to be
consistent with the use of a needle (R. Ill, 130) .
Based on this evidence, Judge Anderson found defendant
guilty as charged (R. 67, 205-08).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: Defendant's assertion that the testimony of Deputy
Don Decamp was inadmissible due to the State's failure to comply
with the burden of laying a foundation for the admission of
scientific evidence is not properly before this Court as
12

defendant failed to make a proper objection below to preserve the
issue for appellate review.
Even on its merits, his claim fails because no scientific
evidence was adduced which required such foundation.

Deputy

Decamp's testimony did not involve scientifically-based facts or
determinations.

Instead, he testified as to his observations and

gave his ultimate opinion based on his education, training and
experience.

Consequently, the State was not required to

establish the specific foundation defendant complains was
lacking.
Point II: Defendant's request that this Court reverse his
conviction for driving under the influence because the trial
judge gave too much weight to the content of the toxicology
report is without merit.

It is exclusively within the

responsibility of the trier of fact to apportion both weight and
credibility to testimony and evidence and to determine what
inferences to draw from the credited facts.

This Court is not in

a position to second-guess these determinations so long as the
lower court's findings are not against the clear weight of the
evidence.

Moreover, defendant invited any error by failing to

correct the prosecution's allegedly erroneous understanding of
the parties' stipulation.
13

Point III: Although the trial court heard arguments from
counsel concerning defendant's constructive possession of
contraband, then rendered an opinion which included numerous
findings related to a determination of constructive possession,
the trial court inadvertently used the phrase "common enterprise"
in lieu of "constructive possession" in rendering its ruling.
However, reversal of defendant's convictions is not warranted
where the underlying findings clearly relate to the required
constructive possession determination, the evidence fully
supports the findings, and the court's ruling does not evidence
any intent by the court to reject the issue of constructive
possession.

Instead, this record permits this Court to correct

the trial court's phraseology and affirm defendant's convictions
based on his constructive possession of contraband.
Point IV: Defendant's claim of insufficient evidence to
support his convictions of possession of paraphernalia and
methamphetamine should be summarily rejected by this Court
because his attempt to marshal the evidence in support of his
convictions is wholly inadequate.
The claim should also be rejected should this Court address
it on its merits.

The claim turns on the sufficiency of the

evidence to establish defendant's constructive possession of the
14

paraphernalia and the drugs. As established in Point III, there
is ample evidence in the record, together with the reasonable
inferences therefrom, to support a finding of constructive
possession of both the paraphernalia and the methamphetamine.

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO DECAMP'S TESTIMONY SHOULD BE
REJECTED BECAUSE IT IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT;
EVEN ON THE MERITS, HIS LEGAL ARGUMENT IS INAPPLICABLE
TO THE FACTS AT HAND
Defendant first challenges the admission of testimony from
Deputy Don Decamp concerning his expertise in drug recognition
evaluation.

He claims that the trial court erroneously qualified

Decamp as an expert and permitted him to give expert testimony
without the foundation required for scientific testimony:
specifically, a general acceptance of the underlying science in
the scientific community, and inherent reliability of the tests.
Appellant's Br. at 6-7.

He faults the State for failing to

adduce evidence to establish Decamp's qualifications beyond his
education through Utah Peace Officer's Standards and Training,
the qualifications of his instructors, and the scientific
principles inherent in the process Decamp was taught.
However, defendant's claim fails for two reasons.

15

Id. at 6.

&^

This Court Need Not Reach Defendant's Claim As It Was Not
Preserved Below And Is Not Araued On Appeal Under The
Doctrines Of Plain Error Or Exceptional Circumstances
First, defendant failed to preserve the issue below, and

presents neither a plain error nor an exceptional circumstance
argument on appeal.

The testimony concerning Decamp's DRE

experience centered around the sobriety testing the officer did
on defendant at the jail-

He had already testified to the

sobriety tests he had administered to defendant at the scene of
the stop, defendant's performance on those tests, and his opinion
as to whether defendant had intoxicants in his system (R. 13 746).

Decamp then outlined his intensive training without

objection from defendant (R. 148-50).

It was not until after

defendant had finished his description of his training and was
describing his success rate on his post-training evaluations that
defendant voiced his only objection relating to foundation:
Q [PROSECUTOR]. In any of those [39 post-training
evaluation] cases, deputy, have you had the ability to track
your successful prediction rate; that is, cases where you
would say subject so-and-so is on cocaine, subject Smith is
under the influence of central nervous system depressant,
then have that conclusion verified by actual chemical tests,
intoxilyzer tests?
[DEFENDANT]: Your Honor, I think we need some
foundation as to what ''successful" would mean. The
testimony that he has made is that, in his opinion, Mr.
Layman was impaired. Presumably, that is what [the
prosecutor] is asking. But I don't know what he means, if
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that means that there has been a conviction, that might be - that might be something that would qualify. If it means
that the presence of something was found in a person's
system, I don't think that corroborates anything as far as
whether or not the person is under the influence, which is
the key issue and what the testimony of this officer was.
So I would like - I am not saying it's impossible to lay
the foundation, but I just don't see how we can define
"successful" as it relates to these 3 9 times that he says
he's done tests.
THE COURT: Where are you going with this?
[PROSECUTOR]: The question, Your Honor, is actually
designed to elicit a response with respect to on how many
occasions in this 3 9 times has there been some sort of a
follow-up verification of whether the person, if the person
submitted to a blood test or urine test, so that we can then
begin to build a foundation that [defense counsel] was
looking for; that obvious follow-up questions will be, how
many times have your conclusions, with respect to whether a
person has been under the influence of a particular
substance been verified by the fact that that person did
indeed have in their system a measure of that substance?
THE COURT: I understand, but to what ultimate goal?
[PROSECUTOR]: Showing his amount [sic] and accuracy,
Your Honor, in evaluating the substance that is affecting
any particular person. And, ultimately, the conclusion
would be that if he were able to accurately identify the
signs of a person being under the influence of marijuana or
methamphetamine, or cocaine, if he reached a conclusion as
to what this defendant was influenced by that evening, he
could offer his opinion with respect to what that substance
was that was affecting this defendant.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Again, my response, Your Honor, is
there is nothing statutory. There is nothing, no way to
measure the issue of under the influence versus any
particular drug happening to be in the system or not. I
don't think this witness has the expertise to say that any
certain indication of quantity or even the presence of any
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individual controlled substance in a person's blood
correlates to being under the influence. And that's the
issue.
[PROSECUTOR]: And I think he's actually fairly accurate
on that point, Your Honor. This particular defendant, the
report that you have before you had, between methamphetamine
and amphetamine, in his blood one microgram per milliliter.
If you were to look at that in a cosmic sense of quantity,
that's a small, small quantity. And I have tried it on
other occasions, you are not going to get any expert to come
into court here and say that, well, that shows a degree of
impairment that is equivalent to a point 2-0. You might get
someone to come in and say that's a tremendous amount or
that's a fair amount. But it's not a science like alcohol.
However ,the court need not wonder [sic] blindly in this
issue of influence of drugs that one of the factors that the
court can examine, should examine, must examine with respect
to whether the defendant was under the influence of drugs to
a degree that rendered him incapable of safely operating a
vehicle, is whether the signs of that drug use were
sufficiently manifest that they could be evaluated by a drug
recognition evaluator. And that's where we are headed.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to view this, I
guess, as a question of weight as well. But with the
admonition that I am wondering where you were going, I'll
overrule the objection and allow you to continue.
(R. 151-54) .3

(A copy of the relevant transcript pages is

attached in addendum B.)

Decamp went on to testify that 3 5 of

the 39 cases were submitted for toxicological testing, and all 35

3

Once the officer testified about his post-certification
success rate, defendant made an "objection" to clarify the
substance of the testimony and ensure the court considered the
testimony appropriately (R. 155-56) . Addendum B.
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verified Decamp's opinion that each of the accuseds had a
controlled substance in his system (R. 154).
The objection put to the court by defendant goes to the
narrow issue of the admissibility of Decamp's post-training, onthe-job success rate based on the definition of "successful."

It

does not bring to the trial court's attention any concern for the
adequacy of the foundation regarding his training and
certification-

Defendant was concerned that the witness would be

permitted to testify that he could determine either the quantity
or the particular substance present in an individual's system
and, based on that determination, declare the person legally
under the influence.

This objection does not challenge the

acceptance of the witness' training in the scientific community
or the inherent reliability of his techniques, as defendant
argues on appeal. Absent a specific objection placing the issue
before the trial court, and absent plain error or exceptional
circumstances arguments on direct appeal, this Court should not
reach the merits of defendant's claim of error.

State v.

Range1, 866 P.2d 607, 612 (Utah App. 1993) (refusing to reach the
merits of issues where the objections in the trial court "were
not specific enough to properly raise and preserve [defendant's
claims of error] for appeal"); State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 361
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(Utah App. 1993) (refusing to reach the merits of an issue, in
part, because defendant did not "bring to the trial court's
conscious awareness or attention" the errors he claims on
appeal); State v. Blubauah. 904 P.2d 688, 700-01 (Utah App. 1995)
(refusing to reach a claim not raised at trial where defendant
failed to argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances
on appeal), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996).
E^

On Its Merits. The Foundational Requirements For Scientific
Evidence Are Inapplicable Where The Challenged Testimony Was
Neither Presented Nor Considered As Scientific Evidence
Should this Court reach the merits of defendant's claim, it

will find that the law cited by defendant is inapplicable to the
testimony at hand.

Defendant argues that Decamp's testimony was

inadmissible because it lacked the foundation required in this
jurisdiction for admission of scientific evidence under State v.
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 400-04 (Utah 1989).

Appellant's Br. at

6-7.
However, where a witness offers opinions based on expertise
arising solely from training, experience and personal
observations, and the court does not view the evidence as being
scientifically based, the foundational requirements set forth in
Rimmasch have no application.

See Salt Lake City v. Garcia, 912

P.2d 997, 1000-01 (Utah App.) (upholding the admission of
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testimony concerning field sobriety testing without the
foundation required for scientifically-based testimony where the
administering officer testified based on his training and
experience, the trial court did not admit the testimony as
scientific evidence, and the jury was specifically instructed not
to consider the testimony to be scientific evidence), cert.
denied. 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996).

£g£ i^L, at 1001 (Bench, J.,'

concurring) ("As indicated in the main opinion, the HGN
[Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus] testimony was not admitted as
scientific evidence.

The foundational requirements discussed in

State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) are therefore not
applicable." (citing State ex rel. G.D. v. L.D., 894 P.2d 1278,
1284 (Utah App. 1995)).
In this case, the Rimmasch foundational requirements are
inapplicable because Decamp's testimony did not involve
scientific evidence, and he was not qualified by the State as an
expert to give scientifically-based evidence.

Instead, Decamp

testified as an expert based on his personal observations,
training, and experience.

As non-scientific, first-hand

observations, his expert opinion was admissible without requiring
the foundation set forth in Rimmasch for the admission of
scientific evidence.

See State ex rel. G.D.. 894 P.2d at 1284
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(the trial court Mid not exceed its permissible range of
discretion" by admitting expert testimony without entertaining a
full Rimmasch analysis "as there was no scientific process on
which to apply such an analysis"); see also Garcia. 912 P.2d at
1000-01.
Deputy Decamp explained in detail the tests he gave
defendant, both at the scene of the initial stop and subsequently
at the jail, and his observations of defendant's attempts to
perform each test or otherwise respond to the officer's
directions (R. 137-48, 156-60).

He then gave his expert opinion,

expressly basing it on his observations, defendant's performance,
the observed physical characteristics, and defendant's mannerisms
and appearance (R. 145-46, 161). When describing some of the
factors giving rise to his opinion, Decamp couched his remarks in
terms of each factor suggesting the presence of a stimulant in
the system, being "associated with" the existence of intoxicants,
or indicating the presence of drugs: he did not testify that any
of the factors he observed in fact established, by any means,
that defendant was under the influence (R. 141, 146, 160). In
laying the foundation for his testimony concerning the testing at
the jail, Decamp explained his training, the high standards
required before certification in drug recognition, his ultimate
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certification, then launched into his post-training experience
(R. 14 8-51).

He explained the extent of his observations and

evaluations of intoxicated individuals, his observations in
controlled and uncontrolled situations, and his postcertification success rate at being able to determine whether any
intoxicant is present in a given individual (R. 149-51, 154-55).
His testimony did not suggest the existence or use of
scientifically-based.facts or determinations.

There was no

testimony that any physical characteristics are scientifically
accepted to establish a particular level of impairment.

In fact,

defendant went out of his way to ensure that the trial court did
not interpret the testimony in just that way by lodging the
objections noted above.

Even Decamp's opinion that Actifed and

cough syrup would not likely explain defendant's physical or
behavioral symptoms was based on his general familiarity with the
general reactions derived from such substances, not from any
scientific process or analysis (R. 160-62).
Not only did the witness' testimony stay within the bounds
of non-scientific opinion testimony, but the trial court
explained that it would consider the testimony in just that
light: in response to defendant's concern that the court would
understand the testimony to suggest that the witness was able to
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somehow determine when and to what degree an individual was
legally impaired as verified by subsequent drug tests, the court
responded, "Well, I am not viewing that as a 35 out of 35
indication of impairment . . . .

I am understanding that to be

that of the 35 cases that he suspected a controlled substance,
the blood test validated his opinion" (R. 155). Addendum B.

The

trial judge thereby expressed his intent to properly limit the
weight of Decamp's testimony, considering it as a trained expert
opinion but not one involving scientific determinations or
pinpoint accuracy.
Because Decamp's opinion was not scientifically based, the
foundational requirements of Rimmasch have no application, and
defendant's claim is without merit.

POINT II
ON THIS RECORD, THE TRIAL COURT'S APPORTIONMENT OF
WEIGHT TO THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT--ADMITTED BY
STIPULATION OF BOTH PARTIES--DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
REVERSIBLE ERROR
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously gave
weight to the content of the State crime lab toxicology report
submitted pursuant to the parties' stipulation.
at 9.

Appellant's Br.

He argues that because the State presented no evidence

concerning who drew his blood or how it was taken, pursuant to
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (5) (a) (Supp. 1996), the results
reflected in the report "are inadequate" and "should have been
given no value."

Id. at 8-9.

Immediately before the first witness was called at trial,
the prosecutor informed the court that the parties had agreed
that the witnesses from the toxicology laboratory and the state
crime laboratory need not testify at trial and that both parties
stipulated to admission of the reports from both laboratories (R.
84-85) (a copy of the oral stipulation is attached in addendum
C).

Defendant "agreed that the reports can be used in lieu of

testimony of them" (R. 84). Addendum C.
During the State's case-in-chief, Deputy Abplanalp testified
that he took the defendant to the Ashley Valley Medical Center
for the blood draw and that he was present during the draw (R.
Ill, 130). Nothing more was said concerning the blood draw or
the testing until closing arguments. At that point, defendant
broached the subject, saying:
. . . [T]he State, I am sure, is going to say that the
lab report, Exhibit No. 1, is indicative of Mr. Layman's
knowledge in some way and somehow [may] be inferred to put
him in possession of the controlled substanpe, which is the
subject of this.
Now, at the preliminary hearing, the State expressly
waived any theory about possession of controlled substance
in a person's system as being a crime. That theory has been
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treated in dicta at the appellate court level. And [the
prosecutor's office] chose not to even pursue it on that
theory and that's expressly on the record.
So, a nodded head and a lab report. Well, the lab
report, I stipulated to its admissibility. But the lab
report is based on a blood draw as such was the testimony
before the court. I would suggest to the court that while I
stipulated to admissibility, there are certain foundational
requirements for admissibility which are there for a reason.
It is a foundational requirement for a blood draw on a DUI
that the blood be taken by a qualified person, and then [the
statute] defines a qualified person as being a medical
doctor, a registered nurse, or someone who has otherwise
been qualified by the State for the purpose of drawing
blood.
In this case, we have nothing before the court saying
who drew the blood, what the preparation was, what the state
of the needle was, what the anything [sic] that would relate
to excluding impurities to insure that the results which
were reached at the State lab have any degree of accuracy
whatsoever. There is no testimony.
Now, while I may have some idea based on discovery
materials, who did a blood draw, the court can't speculate.
And the State has not met its burden of showing that this is
reliable evidence that can be relied upon when we talk about
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would suggest
to the court that the weight to be given anything in that
blood draw is nonexistent or, at least, minimal.
(R. 194-96) . Addendum C.
In rendering his decision, the trial judge made the
following comments:
. . . I do have a toxicology report that came in
showing there was methamphetamine and a lot of
methamphetamine in the bloodstream. I suppose there had to
be evidence that there was a qualified technician that drew
the blood in order to convict for a DUI. Again, that's a
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matter of weight. I assume that the evidence was the blood
was drawn at the Ashley Valley Medical Center,4 They
probably wouldn't have the janitor do it. So I guess as a
matter of weight I am not going to find that's totally
defective and probably within the reasonable contemplation
of the stipulation anyway.
(R. 205-06) (footnote added).

Addendum C.

Having stipulated to the admission of the toxicology report,
defendant cannot challenge that admission on appeal.

Instead, he

challenges the trial court's consideration of the evidence.
Defendant does not claim that the samples used to generate the
report were contaminated or improperly drawn, but merely points
to the absence of testimony establishing the foundation for
admission of such evidence, then argues that, absent such
foundational testimony, the trial court should accord the report
no weight.

Appellant's Br. at 8-9.

This Court should reject his

argument on either of two bases.
First, defendant's claim should be rejected'because he
invited the error from which he now appeals.

Based on the

stipulation entered into with defense counsel, the prosecutor
filed his witness list with the Court on December 9, 1996 (R. 6364) (a copy is included in addendum C).

4

In it, the prosecutor

This was in fact the evidence as testified to by Deputy
Abplanalp (R. Ill).
27

explains, "Relying on the representations of counsel, the State
will not call criminalists, toxicologists or other technical
witnesses with respect to the testing of defendant's bodily
fluids and the suspected controlled substances sought to be
introduced at trial" (R. 63-64).

Addendum C.

Defendant made no

attempt to correct the prosecutor's interpretation of the
stipulation but permitted the State to present its evidence and
rest its case before pointing out to the trial court defendant's
different view of the stipulation.

Accordingly, defendant is not

entitled to relief on appeal based on this claim of error.

See

State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 117 (Utah App. 1994) (even
assuming error, defendant was not entitled to relief where he
invited the error through his own actions).
Second, this Court should reject defendant's attempt to have
it dictate the weight to be given properly admitted evidence
because it is outside the province of appellate courts to
determine the weight or degree of credibility to be given to
testimony or other evidence.

See State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 54 0,

544 (Utah 1994); State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah
1982), nert. denied. 460 U.S. 1044 (1983); State v. Wilkerson.
612 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1980); Taylor v. Johnson. 18 Utah 2d 16,
414 P.2d 575, 578 (1966) . Moreover, if defendant wished to limit
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the weight attributed the report by the trier of fact, he had
some burden to put before the court something other than mere
speculation, especially where he actively placed the evidence
before the trier of fact in the first place. £££, e.g., Taylor.
414 P.2d at 578; see also State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 481
(Utah 1990) (to assist the trier of fact in apportioning weight
and reliability to test results testified to by an expert who did
not conduct the test., uit is incumbent upon the defense to crossexamine the expert as to his contacts with the test procedures
and the reliability of the procedures,").

Defendant instead

chose simply to argue to the court in closing that the State
presented no direct evidence relating to the procedures followed
in drawing the blood.

Hence, the Court apparently had before it

the information defendant felt was necessary to enable the court
to determine that the toxicology report warranted no
consideration.

That the court instead chose to reject

defendant's argument and to apportion some weight to the report
in making its ultimate determination of guilt is within the trier
of fact's responsibility.

Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d at 292.

Further, there is nothing in the record which suggests that
the lower court's decision to consider the toxicology report is
against the clear weight of the evidence.
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State v. Murphy. 872

P.2d 480, 481-82 (Utah App. 1994).

When the court was presented

with the parties' stipulation for admission of the reports, there
was no reservation of foundational issues, justifying the lower
court in concluding that the scope of the stipulation reasonably
included a determination by the parties that the foundational
issues normally required to be addressed prior to a determination
of admissibility were uncontested.

Not only was the

admissibility of the report stipulated by the parties, but the
State established that the blood was drawn at the Ashley Valley
Medical Center in the presence of a trained officer (R. Ill,
130).

These points suggest a proper blood draw and support the

trial court's decision to accord the toxicology report some
weight.

On this record, and without any evidence raising a

question as to the propriety of the blood draw, the trial court's
decision to credit the report is not clear error, and defendant's
claim should be rejected.
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POINT III
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT INAPPROPRIATELY USED THE
PHRASE "COMMON ENTERPRISE" IN RENDERING ITS RULING ON
THE POSSESSION CHARGES, THE UNDERLYING FINDINGS AND THE
ENTIRETY OF THE RULING ESTABLISH THAT THE COURT
ESSENTIALLY FOUND CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE
CONTRABAND, THAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THAT
DETERMINATION, AND THAT THE COURT SIMPLY USED IN
INAPPROPRIATE LABEL IN RENDERING ITS DECISION
In their closing arguments, both counsel recognized that the
evidence showed that defendant was not in actual possession of
the contraband.

Recognizing that the court would, therefore,

have to make a finding on the issue of constructive possession,
State v. fialaa. 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991), both
counsel presented arguments for or against that issue based on
the evidence before the court (R. 193-94, 200-05).

The trial

judge thereafter ruled as follows concerning the possession
charges:
Count 2 [and 3], that's a harder case for me. I guess
my finding there is that this defendant was involved in a
common enterprise. From the testimony that I have heard
here, whether he had contributed cash or vehicle or acted as
the driver, they all had a common mission in coming to
Y^rjial, and that taken together with his dominion, with his
involvement in the trip, with his possession of it in the
motel room, with his apparent dominion nf it. even though
this witness, this other witness testified that she was
given the meth to hold by Hobart, she was hesitant to
testify here that this defendant had an interest in it. But
I think it's obvious from the -joint enterprise they were on
that he. in fact, had an interest in it. The quantity was a
distribution quantity. That taken together with the scales
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and the paraphernalia, I don't know, I guess the
paraphernalia, the only evidence of this is evidence that
the defendant had used both, again, from the toxicology
report, the blood test, and the observations of the officers
who were trained and [sic] identifying people whoever's high

on speed, convince me that the paraphernalia w^g actually,
probably, beyond a reasonable doubt used by Layman on this
evening. I find him guilty on all counts and beyond a
reasonable doubt standard.
(R. 207-08) (emphasis added).5

(A copy of the court's entire

ruling is attached in addendum D.)
On appeal, both defendant and the State agree that both
charges involving possession of contraband must arise from
defendant's constructive possession of the drugs and
paraphernalia.

However, in Point IV of defendant's brief6, he

looks at the trial court's use of the term "common enterprise" in

5

The emphasis in the quoted ruling highlights the trial
court's findings which relate to the constructive possession
argument advanced in the remainder of Point III.
6

Point III of defendant's brief asserts that the trial
court's reliance on a common enterprise theory establishes that
the court found Gina Ziegenhirt to be an incredible witness, then
inappropriately took her testimony and gave substantive weight to
the opposite of what she said, thereby resulting in defendant's
possession convictions. Appellant's Br. at 10-11. The trial
court essentially stated that despite Gina's testimony, the
evidence showed that defendant had an interest in the contraband
(R. 207-08), and the State's response to Point IV of defendant's
brief--urging this Court to uphold the convictions based on the
trial court's ruling and the record evidence--essentially answers
the meritless contention advanced by defendant's third point.
Consequently, the State does not separately address Point III of
defendant's brief.
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its ruling and contends not only that the use of a "common
enterprise" theory is inappropriate, but that the court's failure
to make any findings regarding constructive possession requires
reversal of his convictions. Appellant's Br, at 12-13.7
However, reversal of the convictions is not warranted in this
case where the lower court's ruling demonstrates not only that
the court did not intend to reject the constructive possession
concept, but that the court intended to find constructive
possession and simply attached an inappropriate label to his
ruling.
Constructive possession requires a finding of "a sufficient
nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference
that the accused had both the power and intent to exercise
dominion or control over the drug."

Salas. 820 P.2d at 13 88

(citing State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985)).

In Fox,

the court specified that ''evidence supporting the theory of
'constructive possession' must raise a reasonable inference that
the defendant was engaged in a criminal enterprise and not simply

7

Defendant argues the insufficiency of the evidence to
support a determination of constructive possession in Point V of
his brief. Appellant's Br. at 14-17. For obvious reasons, the
State includes in Point III above a recitation of the evidence
supporting the constructive possession determination.
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a bystander."

709 P.2d at 320. The inference can arise from

circumstantial evidence so long as the guilty verdict is beyond a
reasonable doubt.

State v. Carlson. 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981).

A number of factors have been identified as contributing, in
some combination, to an inference of constructive possession,
including: 1) incriminating statements or behavior on the part of
the accused; 2) presence of the drug or paraphernalia in a place
over which the accused has special control; and 3) defendant's
use of drugs. Fox. 709 P.2d at 319; Salas. 820 P.2d at 1388. Any
single factor may not support a finding of constructive
possession.

See Salas. 820 P.2d at 1388 (mere occupancy,

especially non-exclusive occupancy, of the premises upon which
the drugs are found does not establish the requisite nexus for a
constructive possession determination). However, in this case,
all three factors are clearly present and combine to support a
determination that the requisite nexus existed to establish
constructive possession.

Moreover, the trial court recognized

the presence of these factors by making findings on these points.
The trial judge acknowledged defendant's incriminating
behavior by noting his contribution of his own car and his
driving abilities to get Gina, Hobart and the drugs to Vernal (R.
6, 174-76, 179, 182, 207-08).

From Gina's testimony, it is clear
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that the entire purpose of the trip to her home, then to Vernal,
was the sale of the methamphetamine, which the trial judge noted
(R. 175-76, 178-82, 186-89, 207-08).

The court found that

defendant had apparent dominion of the contraband, referencing
the trio's stop in a motel room in Vernal where the drugs were
openly weighed and divided, as well as Hobart's act of openly
handing a large quantity of the drugs to Gina when defendant
dropped him off and made arrangements to pick him up later (R.
178-83, 207-08).

In fact, nothing in the record suggests that

defendant's participation as driver was involuntary in any way or
that the actions of the others were veiled so that defendant was
deceived into innocently driving the other two on their drug
business.
Deputy Abplanalp's testimony established additional
incriminating behavior.

He explained that while he was trying to

discover what was in the pouch he found in the waistband of
Gina's pants, defendant was standing at the rear of the car four
to five feet away (R. 101-02) . Although there was no verbal
exchange between defendant and Gina at the time, a very nervous
Gina repeatedly refused to relinquish the pouch1to the deputy or
to tell him what was in it, then looked toward defendant while
the deputy continued to ask her questions about the contents of
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the pouch (R. 101-03).

Looking in the same direction, the deputy

saw defendant "shaking his head in a negative fashion back and
forth/' pursuant to which Gina continued to refuse to answer the
deputy's questions and continued to look toward defendant as if
for guidance (R. 102-03).

Such conduct by defendant reasonably

suggests that he knew the contents of the pouch and the
consequences which would result should the officer discover them.
It also reasonably suggests that Gina was looking to defendant
for answers as to what she should do or say because he had some
control over the trip and the drugs and some decision-making
power over her actions regarding the drugs.
The presence of the contraband in a place over which the
accused has special control was recognized by the trial court in
its findings that defendant was not only involved in the trip,
but had contributed his car, had used the paraphernalia and
drugs, had dominion over the contraband, and had an interest in
it (R. 207-08).

The contraband was in defendant's car throughout

the trip, except while the three were in the motel room to divide
the drugs, and defendant never relinquished his control over the
car.

In fact, Hobart's decision to hand the pouch to Gina

instead of defendant when he was dropped off in Vernal may
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reasonably reflect the fact that defendant was driving, not the
fact that defendant had no involvement with the drugs.

I
Defendant's knowledge of and involvement with the drugs and
his knowing participation in the trip is solidified by the trial
court's finding of the third factor:

defendant had ua lot of"

the drugs in his system when stopped after dropping off Hobart
(R. 205-06).

In concluding that defendant had used the

contraband, the trial judge relied on the toxicology report, the
blood test, and the testimony of both officers (R. 207-08).
While the toxicology report has not been made part of the record
on appeal, the court's ruling reflects that the report showed the
existence of ua lot of methamphetamine" in defendant's system (R.
205-06), and the prosecutor represented that defendant had "one
microgram per milliliter" of methamphetamine in his blood (R.
153).

The officers testified about the observations and factors

which led them to conclude that defendant was impaired or under
the influence of drugs (R. 89, 91, 94-96, 120, 126, 136-48, 15659, 161, 163-67; and Point I, supra).

They also testified that

defendant had several needle marks on his arms consistent with
intravenous injection of the methamphetamine found in his system,
and that the pouch retrieved from Gina contained several
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syringes, two of which had been used (R. 104-08, 130, 157-58,
205-06) .
From the findings contained in the trial court's ruling, it
is clear that the trial judge recognized "that the defendant was
engaged in a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander."
Fox, 709 P.2d at 320. The content of the ruling and the numerous
findings all grounded in record evidence suggest that the judge's
use of the phrase "common enterprise" was simply an unfortunate
choice of words which, apparently by accident and not by design,
constitutes a term of art applied in this jurisdiction only in a
business context. See Ball v. Volken. 741 P.2d 958 (Utah 1987);
Payable Accounting Corp. v. McKinley. 667 P.2d 15 (Utah 1983);
Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. Fennemore. 655 P.2d 1111

(Utah 1982);

Smith & Edwards v. Golden Spike Little League. 577 P.2d 132 (Utah
1978).
Based on the trial court's findings, which have ample
support in the record and are geared toward a determination of
constructive possession, this Court should disregard the trial
judge's unfortunate use of the phrase "common enterprise" and
affirm defendant's convictions for possession of contraband based
on his constructive possession of both the drugs and the
paraphernalia. Cf. State v. Jackson. 857 P.2d 267, 269 (Utah App.
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1993) (looking beyond the label attached by the trial court to
the substance of the court's action to decide appropriate posture
of case).

POINT IV
THE RECORD EVIDENCE AND THE REASONABLE INFERENCES
ARISING THEREFROM ARE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
DEFENDANT'S CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE DRUGS AND
THE PARAPHERNALIA AND TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING OF AN INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
In Point V of his brief, defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions of
possession of a controlled substance and possession of
paraphernalia.

Appellant's Br. at 14-17.

He argues that the

conviction requires a finding of constructive possession, that
the facts of this case do not support such a finding, and that
the trial court M i d not find constructive possession" from the
facts before it.

Id.

However, defendant's claim fails for two

reasons.

&*.

This Court Should Net Reach Defendant's Claim Of
Insufficiency Because He Fails To Adequately Marshal The
Evidence In Support Of His Convictions
In order to establish a claim of insufficiency of the

evidence, defendant must marshal all the evidence in support of
the ruling below and demonstrate that, even viewed in a light
most favorable to the lower court, the evidence is insufficient
39

to support the ruling.

State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah

App. 1994); State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah App.
1994).

The marshaling requirement applies to bench trials as

well as to jury trials. State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah
App. 1990) .
Although defendant purports to marshal the evidence, he
mentions only a fraction of the evidence in the three sentences
he presents in his opening paragraph and the three he includes
near the end of his argument.

Appellant's Br. at 14, 16-17.

His

dry recitation of what was before the trial court does not
include the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence
as required by West VfrUey City v.t Majestic InvT CQ,, 818 P.2d
1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991).

He also limits his recitation to

facts occurring at or after the traffic stop by Deputy Abplanalp.
Consequently, his argument includes none of the pre-stop facts,
such as the fact that defendant drove the parties to Vernal in
his car for the sole purpose of conducting what was apparently
intended to be a very lucrative sale of methamphetamine (R. 6,
175-76, 187-88), or the fact that the drugs were openly weighed
and divided while the three were stopped at a motel for that very
purpose (R. 178-82).

Defendant mentions that uthere was a test

showing controlled substances and/or metabolite in the
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defendant's blood[,]" (Appellant's Br. at 14), but fails to
acknowledge that the court noted "there was methamphetamine and a
lot of methamphetamine" in defendant's bloodstream (R. 205-06),
that defendant's performance on the testing he was given at the
scene of the stop and again at the jail suggested to a trained
officer an impairment from "a central nervous system stimulant"
(R. 146, 161), that the paraphernalia in the pouch contained two
"used" syringes (R. 107-08), and that two officers testified to
the existence of several "needle injection marks" on defendant's
arms that were consistent with intravenous injection of the drugs
in his system, with one officer describing what he saw as being
consistent with "fresher or new scars" (R. Ill, 130, 157-58).
Because defendant has failed to comply with the marshaling
requirement, this Court should not consider his sufficiency
challenge.

B^

Pilling, 875 P.2d at 608; Moore. 802 P.2d at 739.

Qn The Merits Defendant's Claim Fails Because The Evidence
Amply Supports His Convictions
Should this Court view the merits of defendant's challenge,

it will find that the evidence, and the reasonable inferences to
be drawn therefrom, amply support the trial court's determination
of guilt on the two challenged charges.
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When reviewing a bench trial under a claim of insufficient
evidence, this Court will affirm the lower court's judgment
"unless it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.'" State v. Reed. 839
P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Goodman. 763
P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988) (additional quotation omitted)).
As defendant recognizes, this issue turns on the sufficiency
of the evidence to establish his constructive possession of the
paraphernalia and the drugs. Appellant's Br. at 14. A
conviction for possession of paraphernalia requires proof of
possession, for use or intended use, of drug paraphernalia as
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3 (1996).
58-37a-5(l) (1996).8

Utah Code Ann. §

This element may be established by a

finding of constructive possession, and the evidence in this
case, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, is sufficient to
warrant such a finding.

See Point III, supra.

A conviction for possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute requires proof of two elements: 1) knowing
and intentional possession of a controlled substance; and 2) an

8

Defendant does not claim that the items found in the pouch
do not constitute paraphernalia as defined by statute.
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intent to distribute it to another.
318 (Utah 1985).

State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316,

Again, the first element may be established by

a finding of constructive possession, which finding has ample
support in this record.

See Point III, £UE£&.

Although it is

not challenged by defendant, the second element may be inferred
where an accused is found to be in possession of a controlled
substance "in a quantity too large for personal consumption[.]"
Fox. 709 P.2d at 320 (citing State v. Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258,
1262 (Utah 1983)).

The evidence here, acknowledged by the trial

court, was that the quantity seized in this case was a
distribution quantity far in excess of what would normally be
found had it been intended for personal use, and the packaging
was highly indicative of an intent to distribute (R. 191-93, 200,
207-08).9

Because the evidence in this matter is sufficient to

establish defendant's constructive possession of both the drugs
and the paraphernalia, and supports the trial court's finding of
an intent to distribute, defendant's convictions are not against
the clear weight of the evidence and should be affirmed by this
Court.

See Reed. 839 P.2d at 879.

9

In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the
officers seized more than fifty times the normal user amount of
methamphetamine from defendant and Gina (R. 200).
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ ^ £ " day of July, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AJLR. — Operation of mopeds and motorized recreational two-, three-, and four-wheeled

vehicles as within scope of driving while intoxicated statutes, 32 A.L.R.5th 669.

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of license.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10);
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments
administered under 10 U.S.C. 815;
(b) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
and
(c) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
' (b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
' (c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2)
is guilty of a:
(a) class B misdemeanor, or
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, or
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time
of the offense.
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(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not
less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, as appropriate; and
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $700, but not more than $1,000.
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the court may
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem
condition involving alcohol or drugs.
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within six years of a
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours
nor more than 720 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not
less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, as appropriate; and
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $800, but not more than $1,000.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a:
(i) class A misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (ii); and
(ii) third degree felony if at least:
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after
April 23,1990; or
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after
July 1, 1996.
(b) (i) Under Subsection (aXi) the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a fine of not less than $2,000, but not more than $5,000 and
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more
than 2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to work in a community-service work program for
not less than 240 nor more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters
in writing on the record the reason it finds the defendant should not
serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court may
be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if
the program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and
long-term closely supervised follow-through after the treatment.
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(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(c) Under Subsection (aXii) if the court suspends the execution of a
prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall
impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500;
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,000 hours; and
(iii) an order requiring the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol
or drug dependency rehabilitation program providing intensive care
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised followthrough after treatment.
(7) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked
as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that:
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education,
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after
July 1,1993, have been completed;
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the conviction
is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within
six years of a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed
after July 1, 1993.
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; or do a combination of those things,
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 under Subsection (9).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction
under Section 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render
in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6).
(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any
community-based or other education program provided for in this section
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services.
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted
under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an
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original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41-6-45 entered under this subsection.
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(11) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted
for the first time under Subsection (2);
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed
within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation; and
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the
court under Subsection (12).
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended
under Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was based on the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90
days, 180 days, or one year to remove from the highways those persons
who have shown they are safety hazards.
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this
subsection, the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division
of the Department of Public Safety an order to suspend or revoke that
person's driving privileges for a specified period of time.
History: L. 1941, ch. 62, ft 34; C. 1943,
67-7-111; L. 1849, ch. 66, ft 1; 1967, ch. 76,
ft 1; 1967, ch. 88, ft 2; 1969, ch. 107, ft 2; 1977,
ch. 268, ft 3; 1979, ch. 243, ft 1; 1981, ch. 63,
ft 2; 1982, ch. 46, ft 1; 1983, ch. 99, ft 13; 1983,
ch.l03,ft 1; 1983, ch. 183, ft 33; 1986, ch. 46,
ft 1; 1986, ch. 122, ft 1; 1986, ch. 178, ft 29;
1987, ch. 138, ft 37; 1987 (1st 8J5L), ch. 8, ft 2;
1988, ch. 17, ft 1; 1990, ch. 183, ft 16; 1990,
ch. 299, ft 1; 1991, ch. 147, ft 1; 1993, ch. 168,
ft 1; 1993, ch. 193, ft 1; 1993, ch. 234, ft 32;
1994, ch. 169, ft 1; 1994, ch. 263, ft 1; 1996,
ch. 71, ft 1; 1996, ch. 220, ft 1; 1996, ch. 223,
ft 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment by ch. 159, effective March 17, 1994,
added Subsection (3XaXiiXB), making related
changes, and substituted "Section 53-3-223" for
"41-2-130" in Subsection (12Xb).

The 1994 amendment by ch. 263, effective
May 2, 1994, subdivided Subsection (12Xa),
substituted "63-3-223" for "41-2-130* in Subseotion (12Xb), and made stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 220, effective
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsections
(6Xb) and (7) concerning punishments for third
and fourth convictions of driving under the
influence; added Subsections (6XaXU) and (6Xc)
making related redesignation and reference
changes; in Subsection (6Xa) added "or subsequent"; in Subsection (6XaXi) substituted -class
A* for "class B"; and made stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 71, effective July
1, 1996, added Subsections UXa) and (13);
redesignated former Subsection (1) as (2Xa)
and (2Kb) and former Subsection (2) as (2Xc);
revised and redesignated former Subsections
(3Xb) and (3Xc) as Subsections (1Kb) and (1XO;
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(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall be deposited in
the General Fund.
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit information to the
database as required under this section after the division has submitted a
specific written request for the information or when the division deter, mines the individual has a demonstrable pattern of failing to submit the
information as required is grounds for the division to take the following
factions in accordance with Section 58-1-401:
(i) refuse to issue a license to the individual;
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license;
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation the license;
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the individual;
(v) issue a cease an<} desist order; and
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each
dispensed prescription regarding which the required information is
not submitted.
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (aXvi) shall be deposited
in the General Fund.
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of this subsection
shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-108, regarding adjudicative
proceedings within the division.
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the database in
accordance with this section may not be held civilly liable for having submitted
the information.
U4) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to establish and
operate the database shall be funded by appropriations from the General
(b) Funding for this section shall bp appropriated without the use of any
resource? within the Commerce Service Fund.
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in
this section shall b? assumed by the submitting drug outlet.
HUtory: C. 1953, 58-377.5, enacted by L.
1995, cb. 333,ft3; 1996, ch. 247,9 44.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection

(IXe) substituted -68-17a-102' for "68-17-2"
and in Subsection (8Xt) added "and' at the end.
Croat-Reference*. — Sentencing for feloniet, (ft 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.

68-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties.
U) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
' distribute.
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (lXa) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
i (i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
'his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
< building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealed frpm those present; however, a person may not be convicted
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so;
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub- ,
stance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "minor1* as defined in Section
78-3a-103, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of
pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the
purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional^mcility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through
(2XaXvii)is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance in violation of this chapter,
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person
not authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under
this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by
this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) shall be punished
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
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a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription,
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (5Xb) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (5XaXi) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center,
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(via) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (5XaXi) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where
the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
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would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5Xa).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if
there is compliance with Subsection (9Kb), impose a minimum term to be
served by the defendant, of up to Va the maximum sentence imposed by law
for the offense committed. For violations of this section, this subsection
supersedes Section 77-18-4.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as
provided in Subsection (9Xa), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9Xa). The allegation
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is
otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
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(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under
Subsection (9Xa) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court,
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9Xa) or under the
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion
determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9Xb).
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) supersedes Section
76-3-203.5.
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the
substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
— for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145,ft 8; 1972, ch. 22, ch. 163, ft 3; 1991, ch. SO, ft 1; 1991, ch. 198,
f 1; 1977, ch. 29, * 6; 1979, ch. 12,ft5; 1985, ft 4; 1991, ch. 268, ft 7; 1995, ch. 284, ft 1;
eh. 146, ft 1; 1986, ch. 196, ft 1; 1987, ch. 92, 1996, ch. 1, ft 8.
I 100; 1987, ch. 190, ft 3; 1988, ch. 95, ft 1;
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amend1989, ch. 50, ft 2; 1989, ch. 56, ft 1; 1989, ch. ment, effective January 31, 1996, substituted
178, ft 1; 1989, ch. 187, ft 2; 1989, ch. 201, ft 1; -minor" for "child" and "78-3a-103" for "78-3a-2"
1990, ch. 161, ft 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990, in Subsection <2XaXv).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Anderson, 283 Utah Adv.
Rep. 12 (Utah 1996).
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(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act.
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 6.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this
act" means Laws 1981, ch. 76, §§ 1 to 6, which
enacted §§ 58-37a-l to 58-37a-6.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Intent.
Search and seizure.
Cited.
Intent.
Where the buyer of drug paraphernalia only
intended to use the items as evidence in a
subsequent criminal prosecution of the seller, it
was factually and legally impossible for the
defendant to have known that items sold would
be used for illegal purposes. State v. Murphy,
674 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1983).
Search and seizure.
The smell of marijuana emanating from a

private residence provides law enforcement officials with probable cause to conduct a search
of the premises. State v. South, 885 P.2d 795
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Although the plain smell doctrine provides
officers probable cause to believe contraband or
evidence of a crime may be found, it does not
automatically provide officers with exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search of a
private residence. State v. South, 885 P.2d 795
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Cited in State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).

58-37a-6. Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights.
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right
can exist in it.
269

Addendum B

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-O0OSTATE OF UTAH,
CASE NO. 961800254

PLAINTIFF,

BENCH TRIAL

VS.
MICHAEL CHARLES LAYMAN,
DEFENDANT.

HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON
-O0OBE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1996,
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION NOW PENDING IN THE ABOVE-NAMED
COURT, WAS HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON,
COMMENCING IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION OF SAID DAY AT THE
UINTAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE, VERNAL, UTAH.
APPEARANCES
FOR PLAINTIFF:

KENNETH R. WALLENTINE
CHIEF DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
152 EAST 100 NORTH
VERNAL, UTAH 84078

FOR DEFENDANT:

ALAN M. WILLIAMS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
365 WEST 50 NORTH, #W10
VERNAL, UTAH 84078

ORIGINAL
FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

FEB 1 0 1997
Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

4Ur/4-CA
?o

FILED
DISTPT- COUTT
l?iv~

JAN 2 11997

Q

SUBSEQUENT TO YOUR CERTIFICATION, HAVE YOU

PERFORMED OTHER DRUG RECOGNITION EVALUATIONS?
A

YES, I HAVE.

Q

CAN YOU GIVE US A FIGURE, HAVE YOU KEPT TRACK OF

HOW MANY?
A
BOOK.

I HAVE KEPT TRACK.

I AM SORRY.

I DIDN'T BRING MY

I BELIEVE I HAVE COMPLETED 39 OF THEM NOW.

Q

; IN ANY OF THOSE CASES, DEPUTY, HAVE YOU HAD THE

ABILITY TO TRACK .YOUR SUCCESSFUL PREDICTION RATE; THAT IS,
CASES WHERE YOU WOULD SAY SUBJECT SO-AND-SO IS ON COCAINE,
SUBJECT SMITH IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM
DEPRESSANT, THEN HAVE THAT CONCLUSION VERIFIED BY ACTUAL
CHEMICAL TESTS, INTOXILYZER TESTS?
C^r

MR. WILLIAMS:

YOUR HONOR, I THINK WE NEED SOME

FOUNDATION AS TO WHAT "SUCCESSFUL" WOULD MEAN.

THE TESTIMONY

THAT HE HAS MADE IS THAT, IN HIS OPINION, MR. LAYMAN WAS
IMPAIRED.

PRESUMABLY, THAT IS WHAT MR. WALLENTINE IS ASKING.

BUT I DON'T KNOW WHAT HE MEANS, IF THAT MEANS THAT THERE HAS
BEEN A CONVICTION, THAT MIGHT BE -- THAT MIGHT BE SOMETHING
THAT WOULD QUALIFY.

IF IT MEANS THAT THE PRESENCE OF

SOMETHING WAS FOUND IN A PERSON'S SYSTEM, I^gON^-THlNK THATCORROBORATES ANYTHING AS, _EAR-AS-WHETHER OR WOT THK PERSONETS
UNDER TjjE-INFLUENCE, WHICH IS THE KEY ISSUE AND WHAT THE
TESTIMONY OF THIS OFFICER WAS.

SO I WOULD LIKE -- I AM NOT

SAYING IT'S IMPOSSIBLE TO LAY THE FOUNDATION, BUT I JUST DON'T
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SEE HOW WE CAN DEFINE "SUCCESSFUL" AS IT RELATES TO THESE 39
TIMES THAT HE SAYS HE'S DONE TESTS.
THE COURT: WHERE ARE YOU GOING WITH THIS?
MR. WALLENTINE:

THE QUESTION, YOUR HONOR, IS

ACTUALLY DESIGNED TO ELICIT A RESPONSE WITH RESPECT TO ON HOW
MANY OCCASIONS IN THIS 39 TIMES HAS THERE BEEN SOME SORT OF A
FOLLOW-UP VERIFICATION OF WHETHER THE PERSON, IF THE PERSON
SUBMITTED TO A BLOOD TEST OR URINE TEST, SO THAT WE CAN THEN
BEGIN TO BUILD A FOUNDATION THAT MR. WILLIAMS WAS LOOKING FOR;
THAT OBVIOUS FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS WILL BE, HOW MANY TIMES HAVE
YOUR CONCLUSIONS, WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER A PERSON HAS BEEN
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A PARTICULAR SUBSTANCE BEEN VERIFIED BY
THE FACT THAT THAT PERSON DID INDEED HAVE IN THEIR SYSTEM A
MEASURE OF THAT SUBSTANCE?
THE COURT:

I UNDERSTAND, BUT TO WHAT ULTIMATE

GOAL?
MR. WALLENTINE:

SHOWING HIS AMOUNT AND ACCURACY,

YOUR HONOR, IN EVALUATING THE SUBSTANCE THAT IS AFFECTING ANY
PARTICULAR PERSON.

AND, ULTIMATELY, THE CONCLUSION WOULD BE

THAT IF HE WERE ABLE TO ACCURATELY IDENTIFY THE SIGNS OF A
PERSON BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MARIJUANA OR
METHAMPHETAMINE, OR COCAINE, IF HE REACHED A CONCLUSION AS TO
WHAT THIS DEFENDANT WAS INFLUENCED BY THAT EVENING,' HE COULD
OFFER HIS OPINION WITH RESPECT TO WHAT THAT SUBSTANCE WAS THAT
WAS AFFECTING THIS DEFENDANT.
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MR. WILLIAMS:

AGAIN, MY RESPONSE, YOUR HONOR, IS

THERE IS NOTHING STATUTORY. THERE IS NOTHING, NO WAY TO
MEASURE THE ISSUE OF UNDER THE INFLUENCE VERSUS ANY PARTICULAR
DRUG HAPPENING TO BE IN THE SYSTEM OR NOT.

I DON'T THINK THIS

WITNESS HAS THE EXPERTISE TO SAY THAT ANY CERTAIN INDICATION
OF QUANTITY OR EVEN THE PRESENCE OF ANY INDIVIDUAL CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE IN A PERSON'S BLOOD CORRELATES TO BEING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE.

AND THAT'S THE ISSUE.
MR. WALLENTINE:

AND I THINK HE'S ACTUALLY FAIRLY

ACCURATE ON THAT POINT, YOUR HONOR.

THIS PARTICULAR

DEFENDANT, THE REPORT THAT YOU HAVE BEFORE YOU HAD, BETWEEN
METHAMPHETAMINE AND AMPHETAMINE, IN HIS BLOOD ONE MICROGRAM
PER MILLILITER.

IF YOU WERE TO LOOK AT THAT IN A COSMIC SENSE

OF QUANTITY, THAT'S A SMALL, SMALL QUANTITY.

AND I HAVE TRIED

IT ON OTHER OCCASIONS, YOU ARE NOT GOING TO GET ANY EXPERT TO
COME INTO COURT HERE AND SAY THAT, WELL, THAT SHOWS A DEGREE
OF IMPAIRMENT THAT IS EQUIVALENT TO A POINT 2-0.

YOU MIGHT

GET SOMEONE TO COME IN AND SAY THAT'S A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OR
THAT'S A FAIR AMOUNT.

BUT IT'S NOT A SCIENCE LIKE ALCOHOL.

HOWEVER, THE COURT NEED NOT WONDER BLINDLY IN THIS ISSUE OF
INFLUENCE OF DRUGS THAT ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT THE COURT CAN
EXAMINE, SHOULD EXAMINE, MUST EXAMINE WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER
THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS TO A DEGREE
THAT RENDERED HIM INCAPABLE OF SAFELY OPERATING A VEHICLE, IS
WHETHER THE SIGNS OF THAT DRUG USE WERE SUFFICIENTLY MANIFEST
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THAT THEY COULD BE EVALUATED BY A DRUG RECOGNITION EVALUATOR.
AND THAT'S WHERE WE ARE HEADED.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

WELL, I'M GOING TO VIEW THIS, I

GUESS, AS A QUESTION OF WEIGHT AS WELL.

BUT WITH THE

ADMONITION THAT I AM WONDERING WHERE YOU WERE GOING, I'LL
QVERRULB^ THE OBJECTION AND ALLOW YOU TO CONTINUE.
Q

(BY MR. WALLENTINE)

SAME QUESTION.

DEPUTY, LET ME RETURN TO THE

DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT THE QUESTION WAS?

A

NO.

YOU GO AHEAD.

Q

YOU SAID YOU PERFORMED APPROXIMATELY 39 OF THESE.

AND HOW MANY OF THOSE TIMES HAVE YOU HAD YOUR RESULTS, YOUR
CONCLUSIONS, HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THEM CHECKED BY A
TOXICOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE SUBJECT'S BLOOD?
A

ON ALL BUT FOUR.

Q

ON ALL BUT FOUR?

A

ON THE FOUR THAT I DID NOT ASK FOR URINE AND BLOOD

SO ROUGHLY 90% OF THE TIME?

SPECIMENS, I DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT
IMPAIRMENT TO JUSTIFY THE COST.

THE CAUSE OF THE MINIMAL

AMOUNT OF IMPAIRMENT MIGHT BE DUE TO SLEEP DEPRIVATION, FOR
EXAMPLE.
Q

FAIR ENOUGH.

AND IN, THOSE INSTANCES, IN THOSE

EVALUATIONS WHERE YOU HAVE HAD BLOOD OR URINE OR BOTH TAKEN,
ON HOW MANY OCCASIONS HAVE YOU PREDICTED OR CONCLUDED A
PARTICULAR SUBJECT TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE AND HAD YOUR CONCLUSION VERIFIED- THROUGH A
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TOXICOLOGICAL TEST?
A

ALL OF THEM.
MR. WILLIAMS:

YOUR HONOR, AND THAT'S AT LEAST THE

WAY THAT QUESTION WAS PHRASED.

IT'S EXACTLYJWHAI_I--WAS

OBJECTING-TO, THAT HE HAS MADE THE DETERMINATION OF
IMPAIRMENT.

AND THE QUESTION WAS, AND HOW MANY TIMES HAS THAT

BEEN VALIDATED BY THE RESULTS.

I DID NOT OBJECT TO THE

EARLIER -n
THE COURT: WELL, I AM NOT VIEWING THAT AS A 35 OUT
OF 35 INDICATION OF IMPAIRMENT.
MR. WALLENTINE:

AND THAT'S NOT WHAT THE QUESTION

WAS, YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT:

I AM UNDERSTANDING THAT TO BE THAT OF

THE 35 CASES THAT HE SUSPECTED A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, THE
BLOOD TEST VALIDATED HIS OPINION.
MR. WILLIAMS:

AND THAT'S WHAT WAS ASKED AND

ANSWERED IN THE PRIOR QUESTION.
DIDN'T OBJECT TO THAT.

BASED ON YOUR RULING, I

BUT THE WAY THAT ONE WAS PHRASED WE

WERE RIGHT BACK TO WHAT I WAS OBJECTING TO BEFORE.
THE COURT: WELL, I AM NOT GOING TO -MR. WALLENTINE:
THE ANSWER, YOUR HONOR.

I THINK YOU HAVE THE QUESTION AND

I THINK YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS

MEANT.
THE COURT:

YES, I AM GOING TO SAY THAT THE COURT

WILL VIEW IT AS I HAVE HEARD IT, AND THE OBJECTION WILL BE
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OVERRULED.
Q

(BY MR. WALLENTINE)

IN THE COURSE OF ADMINISTERING

THE D-R-E, IF WE CAN JUST USE THE SHORTHAND, DID YOU ASK THE
DEFENDANT WHETHER HE HAD BEEN ILL OR WHETHER HE WAS UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF ANY MEDICATIONS?
A

I DID.

Q

AND DID HE TELL YOU WHETHER HE WAS?

A

YES.

LET ME REFER TO MY NOTES.

I BELIEVE HE SAID

HE HAD A COLD AND WAS UNDER ONE OR TWO COLD MEDICATIONS.

HE

DID SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN TAKING ACTIFED AND COUGH SYRUP.
Q

DID HE ALSO TELL YOU HE HAD BEEN TAKING TYLENOL?

A

POSSIBLY.

Q

THE D-R-E FORM CALLS FOR A NUMBER OF PSYCHOPHYSICAL

I DON'T SEE IT RIGHT HERE.

TESTS, INCLUDING THE ROMBERG TEST, NINE-STEP WALK AND TURN,
FINGER TO NOSE.

DID YOU RE-ADMINISTER THESE TESTS ONCE AGAIN

AT THE JAIL?
A

YES, I DID.

Q

AND WOULD YOU BRIEFLY -- AND YOU DON'T NEED TO GO

THROUGH THE INSTRUCTIONS IF THEY ARE THE SAME INSTRUCTIONS YOU
GAVE HIM -- TELL US HOW HE PERFORMED ON THESE PSYCHOPHYSICAL
TESTS ONE BY ONE.
A

ONCE AGAIN, I STARTED WITH HORIZONTAL GAZE AND EYE

STAGMUS.

AND HE STILL DID NOT SHOW HORIZONTAL GAZE AND EYE

STAGMUS.

ON HIS WALK AND TURN TEST, HE MISSED HEEL ON TOE

CONTACT ONCE ON THE RETURN AND STEPPED OFF ONCE. AND HE
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CONCERNING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
MR. WALLENTINE:
THE COURT:

MAY I APPROACH, YOUR HONOR?

YOU MAY.

MR. WALLENTINE:

LET ME SUBMIT AT THIS POINT

EXHIBITS 1 AND 2. AS MR. LAYMAN WAS ANXIOUS TO SET THIS TRIAL
MORE EXPEDITIOUSLY THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITH A JURY,
THE DELAY WITH THE JURY WAS LARGELY OCCASIONED BY THE STATE'S
NOT BEING ABLE TO PRODUCE IN TIMELY FASHION WITNESSES FROM THE
STATE CRIME LAB AND THE TOXICOLOGY LAB.

THEY BOTH HAD

SUBSTANTIAL COMMITMENTS FOR JANUARY AND DECEMBER.

AND IN

CONSIDERATION OF THE STATE'S AGREEMENT TO WAIVE THE JURY IN
THIS MATTER, WE HAVE AGREED THAT THE WITNESSES FROM THE
TOXICOLOGIST LABORATORY AND THE STATE CRIME LABORATORY NEED
NOT APPEAR TODAY AND WILL STIPULATE TO THE REPORTS AND
ADMISSION THEREOF IN THIS PROCEEDING.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

IS THIS THE DEFENDANT'S

STIPULATION?
MR. WILLIAMS:

WE HAVE AGREED THAT THE REPORTS CAN

BE USED IN LIEU OF TESTIMONY OF THEM.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. WALLENTINE:

AND THAT ACTUALLY, PROBABLY, MOVED

US UP A COUPLE MONTHS, YOUR HONOR, WITH RESPECT TO BEING ABLE
TO GET THIS MATTER TRIED.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

I HAVE THEN STATE'S EXHIBIT 1,

WHICH IS A TOXICOLOGY REPORT DATED 1 NOVEMBER '96. AND I HAVE

5

H

-- THERE ARE TWO MARKINGS.

I GUESS THE PINK MARKING BY THIS

COURT IS EXHIBIT NO. 2.
MR. WALLENTINE:

IT IS.

IF YOU JUST IGNORE THOSE

OTHER LABELS, THEY WERE FOR THE PRELIMINARY HEARING.
THE COURT:

EXHIBIT NO. 2 IS A THREE-PAGE DOCUMENT

CONSISTING OF THE STATE CRIME LAB REPORT SUBSTANCE, AND IT
LOOKS LIKE THE EVIDENCE RECEIPT PROPERTY REPORT AND SO FORTH.
THERE IS A DOCUMENT, STATE OF UTAH CRIME LAB EVIDENCE RECEIPT
AND PROPERTY REPORT, THE CRIME LABORATORY REPORT.
TWO-PAGE DOCUMENT.

ALL TOGETHER, THREE PAGES.

MR. WALLENTINE:

THAT'S A

OKAY?

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

THE STATE

FIRST CALLS DEPUTY SHAUN ABPLANALP.
P R O C E E D I N G S
SHAUN ABPLANALP,
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF, HAVING
BEEN PREVIOUSLY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR, WALLENTINE;
Q

GOOD AFTERNOON, DEPUTY.

WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE

YOUR NAME AND TELL US HOW YOU ARE EMPLOYED.
A

DEPUTY SHAUN ABPLANALP, EMPLOYED WITH THE UINTAH

COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT.
Q

AND WERE YOU SO EMPLOYED, DEPUTY, ON AUGUST 12TH,

1996?
A

I WAS.
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RISK THE -- AW, WHAT THE HECK, IT'S LATE.

IT'S NOT THE MORMON

PURCHASE PLAN, IT'S NOT LIKE FOOD STORAGE.
THERE.

I BETTER STOP

I DON'T WANT TO GET AFIELD OF MY STIPULATION.
MR. WILLIAMS:

DOESN'T GO ANY FURTHER THAN THAT.

IT DOESN'T GO ANY FURTHER THAN THAT.

I STIPULATE TO THE

PROFFER, NOT TO THE FACTS.
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

OKAY.

ALL RIGHT.

STATE

RESTS.
MR. WALLENTINE:
THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

WE DO.

DEFENSE RESTS.

OKAY.

ARGUMENT ANYONE?

AND I DON'T

KNOW IF THE STATE'S GOING TO WAIVE OPENING OR -MR. WALLENTINE:

I USUALLY DO.

AND SOMEBODY REALLY

CRITICIZED ME FOR THAT THE OTHER DAY, MADE ME REAL UPSET ABOUT
IT.

I WILL.

IT'S LATE.

MR. WILLIAMS:
VARYING EVIDENCE.

GO AHEAD.

IT'S NOT A JURY.

YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE BEFORE THE COURT

THE COURT IS WELL AWARE OF THE STANDARD OF

PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

I WOULD POINT OUT SOME OF

THE DEFICIENCIES IN WHAT WE HAVE AS IT RELATES TO THE VARYING
CHARGES.
NOW, PARAPHERNALIA CHARGE AND THE POSSESSION OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CHARGE DEPENDS ON POSSESSION, WHICH MEANS
KNOWING ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION OR CONSTRUCTIVE DOMINION
AND CONTROL OVER A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.

UNDER THESE
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CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ONLY EVIDENCE WHICH HAS BEEN PRESENTED BY
THE STATE WHICH WOULD INDICATE ANY CONNECTION WHATSOEVER WITH
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WHICH WERE FOUND INSIDE THE PANTS OF
GINA ZIEGENHIRT, STATE HAS ARGUED THAT MR. LAYMAN, IF HE DID
INDEED SHAKE HIS HEAD BACK AND FORTH, THAT THAT WOULD BE
INDICATIVE OF SOME KIND OF COMMUNICATION.

EVEN IF IT IS, AND

I DON'T KNOW THAT THE STATE HAS PROVED THAT BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT, WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE, IT'S STILL NOT
POSSESSION.

EVEN IF HE KNEW IT WAS THERE, HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY

DOMINION OR CONTROL OVER IT.
SECOND THING IS THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH, THE
STATE, I AM SURE, IS GOING TO SAY THAT THE LAB REPORT, EXHIBIT
NO. 1, IS INDICATIVE OF MR. LAYMAN'S KNOWLEDGE IN SOME WAY AND
SOMEHOW BE INFERRED TO PUT HIM IN POSSESSION OF THE CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS.
NOW, AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, THE STATE
EXPRESSLY WAIVED ANY THEORY ABOUT POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE IN A PERSON'S SYSTEM AS BEING A CRIME.

THAT THEORY

HAS BEEN TREATED IN DICTA AT THE APPELLATE COURT LEVEL.

AND

MRS. STRINGHAM CHOSE NOT TO EVEN PURSUE IT ON THAT THEORY.
AND THAT'S EXPRESSLY ON THE RECORD.
SO, A NODDED HEAD AND A LAB REPORT. WELL, THE LAB
REPORT, I STIPULATED TO ITS ADMISSIBILITY.

BUT THE LAB REPORT

IS BASED ON A BLOOD DRAW AS SUCH WAS THE TESTIMONY BEFORE THE
COURT.

I WOULD SUGGEST TO THE COURT THAT WHILE I STIPULATED
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TO ADMISSIBILITY, THERE ARE CERTAIN FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR ADMISSIBILITY WHICH ARE THERE FOR A REASON.

IT IS A

FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR A BLOOD DRAW ON A DUI THAT THE
BLOOD BE TAKEN BY A QUALIFIED PERSON, AND THEN DEFINES A
QUALIFIED PERSON AS BEING A MEDICAL DOCTOR, A REGISTERED
NURSE, OR SOMEONE WHO HAS OTHERWISE BEEN QUALIFIED BY THE
STATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING BLOOD.
IN THIS CASE, WE HAVE NOTHING BEFORE THE COURT
SAYING WHO DREW THE BLOOD, WHAT THE PREPARATION WAS, WHAT THE
STATE OF THE NEEDLE WAS, WHAT THE ANYTHING THAT WOULD RELATE
TO EXCLUDING IMPURITIES TO INSURE THAT THE RESULTS WHICH WERE
REACHED AT THE STATE LAB HAVE ANY DEGREE OF ACCURACY
WHATSOEVER.

THERE IS NO TESTIMONY.

NOW, WHILE I MAY HAVE SOME IDEA BASED ON DISCOVERY
MATERIALS, WHO DID A BLOOD DRAW, THE COURT CAN'T SPECULATE.
AND THE STATE HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THIS IS
RELIABLE EVIDENCE THAT CAN BE RELIED UPON WHEN WE TALK ABOUT
PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. THEREFORE, I WOULD SUGGEST
TO THE COURT THAT THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN ANYTHING IN THAT
BLOOD DRAW IS NONEXISTENT OR, AT LEAST, MINIMAL.

THE PRIMARY

PURPOSE AND THE AUTHORITY UNDER WHICH THAT BLOOD DRAW WAS
MADE, WAS AN ARREST FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.

AS WE

LOOK AT THE DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE CHARGE, WE ARE
PRESENTED WITH AN INTERESTING DICHOTOMY THAT SOMETIMES WE
COME, WE SEE BEFORE THE COURTS. AND, THAT IS, THE STATE
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ASSERTS THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
SOMETHING.
IN THIS CASE, I AM ASSUMING IT'S UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF DRUGS. WE HAVE AN UNRELIABLE LAB TEST WHICH WAS
NOT, WHICH THERE IS NO PROPER FOUNDATION FOR, AS I POINTED
OUT.

THE INDIVIDUAL, AT THE TIME THAT HE WAS DRIVING, WAS

DRIVING SAFELY.
MORNING HOUR.

THE INDIVIDUAL WAS STOPPED AT AN EARLY

THE INDIVIDUAL, ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE THAT

WE HAVE BEFORE THE COURT, HAD HAD NO SLEEP.

THE INDIVIDUAL,

NOT AT THE TIME OF DRIVING BUT, RATHER, AT SOME POINT AFTER
THE DRIVING, AND WE NEVER COULD ESTABLISH HOW MUCH AFTER THAT,
OFFICER DECAMP NEVER DID TESTIFY THAT HE HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF
WHAT TIME HE TOOK HIS FIRST FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS. AND HE
DOESN'T KNOW, WE HAVE NO TESTIMONY SHOWING HOW LONG HE WAS
THERE BEFORE HE EVEN STARTED ON THOSE TESTS.
WAS BASED ON THOSE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS.

HIS TESTIMONY

THAT, AT THE TIME

THAT HE LOOKED AT HIM HE DID NOT BELIEVE MR. LAYMAN TO BE
CAPABLE OF SAFELY DRIVING A VEHICLE.

BUT HE DID NOT GIVE US

ANY OPINION OF WHAT MR. LAYMAN'S CONDITION WAS AT THE TIME OF
THE DRIVING.
OFFICER ABPLANALP, WHO SAW THE DRIVING AND SAW
MR. LAYMAN IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, DID NOT MAKE ANY NOTATIONS
OF COORDINATION PROBLEMS, SPEECH PROBLEMS, ANYTHING THAT WOULD
INDICATE IMPAIRMENT OTHER THAN WATERY, BLOODSHOT EYES AND A
MOOD -- MOOD SWINGS, WATERY BLOODSHOT EYES AND, I BELIEVE IN
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COMMON SENSE, JUDGE.

YOU HAVE TO TAKE A LOOK AT SOMEBODY WHO

PULLS OVER QUICKLY, EXECUTES A WILD HAIR TURN, PLACES HIMSELF
IN A POSITION OF DANGER TO THE DEPUTY, CHARGES, DOES ALL OF
THESE THINGS, EXHIBITS ALL OF THESE PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS. THEN
YOU HAVE TO ASK YOURSELF, OKAY.

COUPLE THAT WITH THE

KNOWLEDGE THAT HE HAD METHAMPHETAMINE IN HIS SYSTEM AT THE
TIME AND COUPLED WITH THEY HAD INJECTION SITES AND ASK
YOURSELF, JUDGE, IS THIS ALL DUE TO SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND
COUGH SYRUP?

NO.

IT'S DUE TO BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF

METHAMPHETAMINE.
THE COURT: WOULD YOU TELL MISS ZIBGENHIRT THAT SHE
CAN LEAVE.
MR. WALLENTINE:
STRAIGHTEN SOMETHING OUT.

ACTUALLY, YOUR HONOR, I NEED TO GO
APPARENTLY, THERE IS A WARRANT FOR

HER SHE'S BEING HELD ON -THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. WALLENTINE:
THE COURT:

-- I DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT.

I'LL EXCUSE YOU FOR A MINUTE IF YOU

WANT TO DO THAT.
WELL, THERE IS A MYRIAD OF ISSUES THAT ARE BEFORE
ME:

THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE TEST, THERE IS NO REAL OBJECTIVE

TEST FOR ONE WHO IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF METHAMPHETAMINE AS
TO HIS OR HER ABILITY TO OPERATE MACHINERY OR MOTOR VEHICLE.
THE ONLY THING I HAVE BEFORE ME, I DO HAVE A TOXICOLOGY REPORT
THAT CAME IN SHOWING THERE WAS METHAMPHETAMINE AND A LOT OF
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METHAMPHETAMINE IN THE BLOODSTREAM.

I SUPPOSE THERE HAD TO BE

EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A QUALIFIED TECHNICIAN THAT DREW THE
BLOOD IN ORDER TO CONVICT FOR A DUI. AGAIN, THAT'S A MATTER
OF WEIGHT.

I ASSUME THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS THE BLOOD WAS DRAWN

AT THE ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER.
HAVE THE JANITOR DO IT.

THEY PROBABLY WOULDN'T

SO I GUESS AS A MATTER OF WEIGHT I AM

NOT GOING TO FIND THAT'S TOTALLY DEFECTIVE AND PROBABLY WITHIN
THE REASONABLE CONTEMPLATION OF THE STIPULATION ANYWAY.
SECONDLY, I THINK THE TIME FRAME, THE BLOOD DRAW TO
THE DRIVING IS PROBABLY OKAY BASED UPON MY PUTTING TOGETHER
THE TESTIMONY AND PATTERN OF EVENTS.

I DON'T KNOW THAT

OFFICER DECAMP SAID IN HIS OPINION THAT LAYMAN WAS NOT A SAFE
DRIVER.

ALTHOUGH, HE DID FAIRLY WELL ON SOME OF THE TESTS,

WHAT I AM FOCUSING ON HERE IS THE IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR THAT THE
METHAMPHETAMINE SUBSTANCE MAY CAUSE.

AND, THAT IS, SOMEONE

MAYBE MECHANICALLY COULD PERFORM A TEST AND DO FINE.
FIGHTER PILOT COULD PERFORM WELL IN A SIMULATOR.

MAYBE A

BUT, GIVEN

EXTERNAL FACTORS, BUT GIVEN ANOTHER DRIVER WHO DID SOMETHING
STUPID, ONE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THIS STUFF IS LIKELY TO
REACT IRRATIONALLY AND BECOME A VIOLENT DRIVER.
CONTROL OF HIS FACULTIES IS OKAY.

MAYBE THE

BUT WE JUST CAN'T CONDONE

PEOPLE DRIVING AROUND IN VEHICLES UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE UNDER ANY OBJECTIVE SET OF FACTS.

IF I

CAN SEE THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE BOTH FROM OFFICER ABPLANALP OF
AN AGITATED DRIVER, OF AN AGITATED, FIDGETY PERSON WHO
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KENNETH R. WALLENTINE #5817
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
152 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
(801) 781-5436
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
STATE'S WITNESS LIST

vs.
MICHAEL CHARLES LAYMAN
Defendant.

No. 961800254 FS
Hon. A. Lynn Payne

The State of Utah, by its counsel, Chief Deputy County Attorney Kenneth R.
Wallentine, gives notice that it intends to call the following witnesses at trial:
1.

Shaun Abplanalp, Don DeCamp, DeNile Gale, Uintah County Sheriffs Office.

2.

Robert Faircloth, Vernal City Police Department.

3.

Reid Merrell, Adult Probation & Parole.

4.

Gina Ziegenhirt, c/o Russell Doncouse, 2411 Kiesel Avenue, Suite 415,

Ogden, Utah.
5.

Relying on the representations of counsel, the State will not call criminalists,

toxicologists or other technical witnesses with respect to the testing of defendant's bodily

fluids and the suspected controlled substances sought to be introduced at trial.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of December, 1996.

Kenneth K. Wallentine
Chief Deputy County Attorney

I certify that I deposited a copy of the foregoing witness list to Alan Williams,
attorney for defendant in his box at the Uintah Coujtfy-^ttorneys Office this 6th day of
December, 1996.

Addendum D

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-O0OSTATE OF UTAH,
CASE NO. 961800254

PLAINTIFF,
VS.

BENCH TRIAL

MICHAEL CHARLES LAYMAN,
DEFENDANT.
HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON
-O0OBE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1996,
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION NOW PENDING IN THE ABOVE-NAMED
COURT, WAS HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON,
COMMENCING IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION OF SAID DAY AT THE
UINTAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE, VERNAL, UTAH.
APPEARANCES
FOR PLAINTIFF:

KENNETH R. WALLENTINE
CHIEF DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
152 EAST 100 NORTH
VERNAL, UTAH 84078

FOR DEFENDANT:

ALAN M. WILLIAMS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
365 WEST 50 NORTH, #W10
VERNAL, UTAH 84078

ORIGINAL
FILED
Utah Court of Appeals
FEB 1 0 1997
Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

^lootm-ifi
fO

FILED
DISTPT" COURT
inv-.

• ••••

- . u

JAN 2 1 1997
iC;,x,C

-bEFUTY

COMMON SENSE, JUDGE.

YOU HAVE TO TAKE A LOOK AT SOMEBODY WHO

PULLS OVER QUICKLY, EXECUTES A WILD HAIR TURN, PLACES HIMSELF
IN A POSITION OF DANGER TO THE DEPUTY, CHARGES, DOES ALL OF
THESE THINGS, EXHIBITS ALL OF THESE PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS.
YOU HAVE TO ASK YOURSELF, OKAY.

THEN

COUPLE THAT WITH THE

KNOWLEDGE THAT HE HAD METHAMPHETAMINE IN HIS SYSTEM AT THE
TIME AND COUPLED WITH THEY HAD INJECTION SITES AND ASK
YOURSELF, JUDGE, IS THIS ALL DUE TO SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND
COUGH SYRUP?

NO.

IT'S DUE TO BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF

METHAMPHETAMINE.
THE COURT: WOULD YOU TELL MISS ZIBGENHIRT THAT SHE
CAN LEAVE.
MR. WALLENTINE:
STRAIGHTEN SOMETHING OUT.

ACTUALLY, YOUR HONOR, I NEED TO GO
APPARENTLY, THERE IS A WARRANT FOR

HER SHE'S BEING HELD ON -THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. WALLENTINE:
THE COURT:

-- I DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT.

I'LL EXCUSE YOU FOR A MINUTE IF YOU

WANT TO DO THAT.
WELL, THERE IS A MYRIAD OF ISSUES THAT ARE BEFORE
ME:

THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE TEST, THERE IS NO REAL OBJECTIVE

TEST FOR ONE WHO IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF METHAMPHETAMINE AS
TO HIS OR HER ABILITY TO OPERATE MACHINERY OR MOTOR VEHICLE.
THE ONLY THING I HAVE BEFORE ME, I DO HAVE A TOXICOLOGY REPORT
THAT CAME IN SHOWING THERE WAS METHAMPHETAMINE AND A LOT OF
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1

METHAMPHETAMINE IN THE BLOODSTREAM.

2

EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A QUALIFIED TECHNICIAN THAT DREW THE

3

BLOOD IN ORDER TO CONVICT FOR A DUI. AGAIN, THAT'S A MATTER

4

OF WEIGHT.

5

AT THE ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER.

6

HAVE THE JANITOR DO IT.

7

NOT GOING TO FIND THAT'S TOTALLY DEFECTIVE AND PROBABLY WITHIN

8

THE REASONABLE CONTEMPLATION OF THE STIPULATION ANYWAY.

9

I SUPPOSE THERE HAD TO BE

I ASSUME THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS THE BLOOD WAS DRAWN
THEY PROBABLY WOULDN'T

SO I GUESS AS A MATTER OF WEIGHT I AM

SECONDLY, I THINK THE TIME FRAME, THE BLOOD DRAW TO

10

THE DRIVING IS PROBABLY OKAY BASED UPON MY PUTTING TOGETHER

11

THE TESTIMONY AND PATTERN OF EVENTS.

12

OFFICER DECAMP SAID IN HIS OPINION THAT LAYMAN WAS NOT A SAFE

13

DRIVER.

14

WHAT I AM FOCUSING ON HERE IS THE IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR THAT THE

15

METHAMPHETAMINE SUBSTANCE MAY CAUSE.

16

MAYBE MECHANICALLY COULD PERFORM A TEST AND DO FINE.

17

FIGHTER PILOT COULD PERFORM WELL IN A SIMULATOR.

18

EXTERNAL FACTORS, BUT GIVEN ANOTHER DRIVER WHO DID SOMETHING

19

STUPID, ONE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THIS STUFF IS LIKELY TO

20

REACT IRRATIONALLY A N D BECOME A VIOLENT DRIVER.

21

CONTROL OF HIS FACULTIES IS OKAY.

22

PEOPLE DRIVING AROUND IN VEHICLES UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF

23

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE UNDER ANY OBJECTIVE SBT OF FACTS.

24

CAN SEE THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE BOTH FROM OFFICER ABPLANALP OF

25

AN AGITATED DRIVER, OF AN AGITATED, FIDGETY PERSON WHO

I DON'T KNOW THAT

ALTHOUGH, HE DID FAIRLY WELL ON SOME OF THE TESTS,

AND, THAT IS, SOMEONE
MAYBE A

BUT, GIVEN

MAYBE THE

BUT WE JUST CAN'T CONDONE

IF I
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1

COULDN'T H O L D STILL W H O WAS TALKING FAST, W H O H A D SYMPTOMS OF

2

BEING UNDER T H E INFLUENCE OF A CENTRAL NERVOUS

3

S T I M U L A N T , I D O N ' T T H I N K T H E R E IS A N Y O B J E C T I V E W A Y O R

4

ANYTHING ELSE T O PROVE THAT HE'S A N UNSAFE DRIVER OTHER THAN

5

T O PRESUME THAT BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT OF T H E DRUG EVERY CASE

6

MUST BE LOOKED A T INDIVIDUALLY.

7

TESTIMONY AND OF THE TEST, I AM GOING TO FIND THAT ALTHOUGH

8

T H E R E W A S N O D I R E C T E V I D E N C E O F A B A D D R I V I N G PATTERN, T H E R E

9

W A S E N O U G H E V I D E N C E O F I N T O X I C A T I O N O F M E T H A M P H E T A M I N E IN T H I S

10

CASE TO CONVINCE ME THAT HE WAS AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN AN

11

UNSAFE DRIVER.

12

ON COUNT 1.

13

SYSTEM

B U T ON THE BASIS OF THE

SO THAT'S THE BASIS FOR M Y FINDING OF GUILTY

C O U N T 2, T H A T ' S A H A R D E R C A S E F O R M E .

I GUESS MY

14

F I N D I N G T H E R E IS T H A T T H I S D E F E N D A N T W A S I N V O L V E D IN A C O M M O N

15

ENTERPRISE.

16

WHETHER HE H A D CONTRIBUTED CASH OR VEHICLE OR ACTED A S THE

17

D R I V E R , T H E Y A L L H A D A C O M M O N M I S S I O N IN C O M I N G T O V E R N A L , A N D

18

T H A T T A K E N T O G E T H E R W I T H H I S D O M I N I O N , W I T H H I S I N V O L V E M E N T IN

19

T H E T R I P , W I T H H I S P O S S E S S I O N O F I T IN T H E M O T E L ROOM,

20

H I S A P P A R E N T D O M I N I O N O F IT, E V E N T H O U G H T H I S W I T N E S S , T H I S

21

OTHER WITNESS TESTIFIED THAT SHE WAS GIVEN THE METH TO HOLD B Y

22

HOBART, SHE WAS HESITANT T O TESTIFY HERE THAT THIS DEFENDANT

23

H A D A N I N T E R E S T IN I T .

24

JOINT ENTERPRISE THEY WERE ON THAT HE, IN FACT, HAD AN

25

I N T E R E S T IN I T .

FROM THE TESTIMONY THAT I HAVE HEARD HERE,

WITH

B U T I THINK IT'S OBVIOUS FROM T H E

T H E QUANTITY WAS A DISTRIBUTION QUANTITY.
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THAT TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE SCALES AND THE PARAPHERNALIA, I
DON'T KNOW, I GUESS THE PARAPHERNALIA, THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF
THIS IS EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD USED BOTH, AGAIN, FROM
THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT, THE BLOOD TEST, AND THE OBSERVATIONS OF
THE OFFICERS WHO WERE TRAINED AND IDENTIFYING PEOPLE WHOEVER'S
HIGH ON SPEED, CONVINCE ME THAT THE PARAPHERNALIA WAS
ACTUALLY, PROBABLY, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT USED BY LAYMAN
ON THIS EVENING.

I FIND HIM GUILTY ON ALL COUNTS AND BEYOND A

REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD.
THE COURT: WHAT IS YOUR PLEASURE WITH RESPECT TO
SENTENCING, MR. WILLIAMS?
MR. WILLIAMS:

WELL, YOUR HONOR, I THINK THAT IT'S

OBVIOUS THAT WE ARE GOING TO BE DOING THE APPEAL IN THIS WHERE
HE'S INCARCERATED ALREADY.
DISCUSSED IT BRIEFLY.

AND WE DISCUSSED -- I BELIEVE WE

I THINK HE WAIVED TIME FOR SENTENCING.

GO AHEAD TODAY SO THAT WE CAN GET THIS UP TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS, YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. WALLENTINE:

I DON'T THINK A PS I WOULD MAKE ANY

DIFFERENCE -THE COURT:

I AM --

MR. WALLENTINE:
THE COURT:

--IF THAT'S EASIER FOR YOU.

I AM WILLING TO IMPOSE SENTENCE TODAY

WITHOUT A PSI IF THE DEFENDANT AGREES.
THE DEFENDANT:

YES, SIR.
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